Political Variables in the (Re)Allocation of Fiscal Resources Among Different Levels of Government
Keywords:
coparticipación, recursos de acción, federalismo fiscal, negociaciones intergubernamentales, redistribución territorial Coparticipation, action resources, fiscal federalism, intergubernamental negotiations, territorial redistribution
Abstract
Federal Revenue-Share System has been the result of complex negotiation processes where the involvement of their signatories (president and governors) is crucial to understand the outcomes achieved. In its evolution, this regime has reached an extraordinary reditributive effect in favour of the poorest and lesser developed provinces. At the same time, this same set of provinces presents, in turn, a strong overrepresentation in Congress. Based on these two assumptions, the aim of this paper is to show how those institutional resources (i.e., overrepresentation), can play as explanatory variables for the obtaining of greater material resources (revenue sharing system).
